Revista Internacional de Pesquisa Contábil

Abstrato

Will Stock Pledge Lead to Over-investment?

Bi Jinling Xu Huaichen cc

This paper takes the 2005-2017 A-share stock pledge listed company as a research sample, and studies the financial decision-making behavior of stock pledge company from the perspective of investment efficiency. The consequence shows that the higher the proportion of stock pledge, the higher the company's over-investment level, the controlling shareholder's stock pledge and the company's over-investment are significantly positively correlated, the higher the proportion of share pledge, the more serious the over-investment. Further research has found that the positive impact of stock pledge on the level of over-investment will be weakened in state-owned enterprises and when government issued a bailout policy. It is found that after the stock pledge, the listed company will not only stabilize the stock price through direct means, but also influence the stock price through indirect investment decisions, and the property rights of the enterprise and the government's macro policy will play a role in this process.